Multilevel transactions have been proposed for multilevel secure databases; in contrast to most proposals, such transactions allow users to read and write across multiple security levels. The security requirement that no high level operation in uence a low level operation often con icts with the atomicity requirement o f the standard transaction processing model. In particular, others have shown that no concurrency control algorithm based on the standard transaction processing model can guarantee both atomicity and security. This con ict motivates us to propose an alternative semantic-based transaction processing model for multilevel transactions. Our model uses the semantics of the application to analyze an application and reason about its behavior. Our notion of correctness is based on semantic correctness instead of serializability as in the standard transaction processing model. Semantic correctness ensures that database consistency is maintained, transactions output consistent data, and all partially executed transactions complete. We show h o w an example application can be analyzed to assure semantic correctness and how this analysis can be automated. We also propose a simple timestamp-based multiversion concurrency control algorithm for transaction processing on a kernelized architecture. The advantages of our model over the standard transaction processing model are that atomicity can be assessed, and for some applications ensured via o line analysis, more concurrency is achieved, lesser synchronization between security levels is required, and a larger class of multilevel transactions can be processed.
Introduction
Most of the research i n transaction processing in multilevel secure databases is limited to singlelevel transactions. A xed security level is associated with a single-level transaction, which can read objects that are at its level or below, but can only write objects that are at its level. The need for multilevel transactions transactions that can read and write objects at di erent security levels arises in many applications. The standard transaction processing model BHG87 based on serializability is not appropriate for multilevel transactions executing multilevel transactions using mechanisms based on the standard transaction processing model may result in illegal information ow. Although the serializability model has been adapted for multilevel transactions CM92, CJ93 atomicity cannot be ensured. In this work, we propose an alternative semantic-based transaction processing model which is appropriate for multilevel transactions. The chief advantage is that appear in a history. The consistent execution property ensures that if a complete semantic history executes in a consistent state, the nal state is also consistent. The sensitive transaction isolation property ensures that no inconsistencies are displayed to the user. These properties are more relaxed than their counterparts in the standard transaction processing model, and form the basis of semantic correctness. In addition to the replacement properties we specify two more properties, namely the composition property and the isolation atomicity property. The composition property ensures that a decomposition correctly models the original transaction. The isolation atomicity property ensures that if the lowest level section of a transaction has been executed, then it will be possible to execute all the other sections of the transaction when the transaction is executed in isolation. The isolation atomicity property is necessary if transactions are to be executed by algorithms based on the standard transaction processing model CM92, CJ93 ; this property, h o w ever, is optional in our semantic-based model.
The properties generate a set of proof obligations for a given application. The proof obligations must be successfully discharged to get assurance of the properties. As a feasibility study, w e show how to get assurance of these properties for a speci c application by enumerating and discharging the associated proof obligations using the Z speci cation language Spi92 . For large complex applications, it is desirable to automate as much as possible the process of discharging the proof obligations. One solution is to use a theorem prover to automatically discharge the proof obligations. However, theorem proving is tedious, time consuming, di cult, and requires substantial expertise. This motivated us to adopt an alternate software veri cation technique known as model checking for our analysis. We show h o w the SMV model checker McM92, CGL94 can be used, in part, to automatically discharge the proof obligations.
It is worth noting that the various properties are correctness properties rather than security properties. In other words, although an erroneous proof may result in an application that does not behave a s i n tended with respect to functionality, the erroneous proof does not result in a security breach.
Once all the properties have been proved, the application must be executed by some concurrency control algorithm. Towards this end, we develop a simple timestamp based mechanism on a kernelized architecture for concurrently executing the decomposed multilevel transactions. The advantages of our model over the standard transaction processing model are that our model provides more concurrency, requires lesser synchronization between security levels and can process multilevel transactions which do not have isolation atomicity.
Related Work
The earliest works on multilevel transactions were done by Costich, Jajodia and McDermott CM92, CJ93 ; the authors present concurrency control algorithms based on kernelized CJ93 and replicated CM92 architectures which produce one-copy serializable histories of multilevel transactions. The algorithm proposed by Costich and McDermott CM92 has a restriction: it can only execute transactions in which n o l o w data item is written after accessing a high data item. This algorithm also requires the operations in a transaction to be ordered according to the security lattice structure. This requirement i s o b viated in the algorithm proposed by Costich and Jajodia CJ93 and it accepts multilevel transactions where operations are not necessarily arranged in the order of security levels. This algorithm CJ93 saves all the versions written by a transaction, and by using an indexing technique records the version of x that must be given to a read x operation. This technique always gives the correct version of x although the execution order may be di erent from that speci ed in the transaction. In both these works, the authors make an assumption if one section of a transaction is successfully executed then it will be possible to execute all the other sections successfully.
This assumption makes the algorithms proposed by Costich and others CM92, CJ93 suitable for only a limited class of multilevel transactions transactions satisfying isolation atomicity property AJR96 .
Blaustein et al. BJMN93 discuss the problem of ensuring atomicity for multilevel transactions and propose three degrees of atomicity for multilevel transactions ML atomicity, L atomicity and complete atomicity. ML atomicity requires that if a section commits, then all sections at dominated levels must also commit. L atomicity requires that if a section commits, then all sections dominated by security level L must also commit. Complete atomicity requires that if a section commits then all other sections must also commit; complete atomicity corresponds to the traditional atomicity GR93 . The authors also propose the notion of an execution graph which determines if the atomicity requirement o f a m ultilevel transaction can be satis ed. The authors give t w o transaction processing algorithms High-Ready-Wait and Low-First. The High-Ready-Wait algorithm is a two-phased algorithm. In the rst phase the sections of a multilevel transaction are executed but not committed in a high to low order; in the second phase the sections are committed in the low to high order. The High-Ready-Wait su ers from three problems. First, it cannot handle multilevel transactions having low to high dependencies. Second, it is suitable only for those multilevel transactions in which the security levels of the sections are linearly ordered; that is, it cannot handle multilevel transactions in which t w o sections have incomparable security levels. Third, it contains a limited bandwidth timing channel; a high section can modulate the time it takes to execute and thereby convey information t o a l o w section. Unlike High-Ready-Wait, Low-First executes and commits sections of a multilevel transaction in a low to high order. The limitation of Low-First is that it cannot guarantee complete atomicity o f m ultilevel transactions.
A formal treatment o f m ultilevel transactions is presented by Smith et al. SBJN96 . The authors de ne four correctness properties of multilevel transactions. These are atomicity, consistency, isolation and security. Atomicity A correctness requires either all or none of the operations in a transaction to commit. Consistency C correctness requires that the order of con icting operations in a transaction be preserved in the schedule. Isolation I Correctness requires that the concurrent execution of a set of transactions be equivalent to the serial execution of the set of transactions. Security S Correctness requires that in a schedule no operations at a dominated level is in uenced by a n y operation at a dominating level. The authors argue why it is impossible to give algorithms which guarantee the satisfaction of all four correctness properties. More speci cally, it is impossible to give algorithms which guarantee both A correctness and S correctness. The authors also de ne partial correctness criteria based on relaxing the properties. The relaxed atomicity criterion, referred to as A , correctness, corresponds to ML atomicity BJMN93 . S , correctness, the relaxed security criterion, is like S correctness, except that it allows timing channels. I , correctness, the relaxed isolation property, a c hieves only degree 2 isolation GR93 .
The authors SBJN96 give three algorithms : i Low-Ready-Wait, ii Low-First with Multiversion Timestamp Order, and iii Low-First with Hybrid Multiversioning. The Low-Ready-Wait algorithm is based on two phase locking; the sections are executed in the ascending order and are committed in the descending order of security levels. This algorithm ensures atomicity, consistency, isolation and relaxed security. In the Low-First with Multiversion Timestamp Ordering the sections are executed and committed in the ascending order of security levels. A unique timestamp is assigned to the transaction; sections inherit the timestamps of the transaction. If a section reads from a strictly dominated section of another transaction with an earlier timestamp, then it must wait for the completion of these strictly dominated sections. This algorithm ensures ML-atomicity, consistency, isolation and security. In Low-First with Hybrid Multiversioning the sections are executed and committed in the ascending order of security levels. Unlike L o w-First with Multiversion Timestamp Ordering algorithm, sections are assigned unique timestamps. For reading and writing data items at its own level, a section follows the locking rules. For read downs, the timestamp ordering rules determine the version of the data item that will be read. This algorithm ensures ML-atomicity, consistency, security and degree 2 isolation.
The shortcomings of the standard transaction processing model and the need for alternative semantic-based transaction processing approaches is well researched in the context of long duration transactions. In these works AAS93, AJR97, BL96, F O89, GM83, GMS87, KS94 , the authors have introduced the notions of transaction decomposition, transaction steps, compensating steps, allowed versus prohibited interleavings of steps, and implementations in locking environments. The correctness of executions is based on semantic correctness and not on serializability. The goal of these works is to provide better performance than that provided by the standard transaction processing model.
Semantic-based transaction processing in the multilevel secure domain has been proposed by Ammann et al. AJR96 . In this work the semantics of the application is used to statically analyze an application and determine its behavior. Correctness of the application was assessed in terms of satisfaction of the necessary properties. However in this work AJR96 the ideas were informally presented. Our current w ork extends the work AJR96 in the following ways: formalization of the properties, generating and discharging the proof obligations for a typical application, automated veri cation of the properties for the application using model checking approach, developing a notion of correctness for concurrent execution of a set of multilevel transactions, and giving a concurrency control algorithm based on a kernelized architecture.
Organization of the Paper
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a motivating example the mission database. Section 3 discusses the decomposition of multilevel transactions into sections; this section also discusses how to arrange the sections according to the security poset partially ordered set structure which is necessary for reasons of security. Section 4 discusses the details of our model. Section 5 presents the notion of correctness for concurrent execution of multilevel transactions. Section 6 describes a concurrency control algorithm based on a kernelized architecture. Section 7 concludes the paper. Appendix A illustrates how the the properties can be proved by hand for the mission example. Appendix B describes automated veri cation of the properties for the mission example with the SMV model checker McM92, CGL94 .
A Semantic View of Multilevel Transactions
We consider a security structure that is a partial order, C, . C is a set of security levels or classes, and is the dominance relation between classes. If C 1 C 2 , C 2 is said to dominate C 1 and C 1 is said to be dominated by C 2 . If C 1 C 2 , C 2 is said to strictly dominate C 1 and C 1 is said to be strictly dominated by C 2 . Two classes C 1 and C 2 are said to be incomparable if neither C 1 C 2 nor C 2 C 1 .
A database is composed of a collection of objects where each object is associated with a single security level. At a n y given time, the state is determined by the values of the objects in the database. A c hange in the value of a database object changes the state. A database also has some predicates de ned on the objects. These predicates are known as invariants or integrity constraints. A database state is said to be consistent if the values of the objects satisfy the given integrity constraints; otherwise the database is said to be in an inconsistent state. We do not impose any constraint on the nature of integrity constraints. That is, integrity constraints may be de ned over objects belonging to the same level or they may be de ned over objects belonging to di erent security levels. A section of level C can view only those integrity constraints which i n v olve objects at level C or below. Consequently, only the highest section, if present, can view all the integrity constraints of the database. Each m ultilevel transaction is speci ed with a set of preconditions and a set of postconditions on the database objects. A precondition limits the database states to which a m ultilevel transaction can be applied. A postcondition constrains the possible database states after a multilevel transaction completes. Together, preconditions and postconditions ensure that if a multilevel transaction executes on a consistent state, the result is again a consistent state. Postconditions of a multilevel transaction can update objects at di erent security levels; this is in contrast to single-level transactions where postconditions can update objects at only one security level.
An Example Illustrating Our View
In this paper we adopt the Z speci cation language for formalizing our ideas. Z is based on set theory, rst order predicate logic, and a schema calculus to organize large speci cations. Knowledge of Z is helpful, but not required, for reading this paper, since we narrate the formal speci cations in English. Table 1 brie y explains the Z notation used in our examples. Other speci cation and analysis conventions peculiar to Z are explained as the need arises.
We illustrate our view with an example of a mission database. A Z speci cation appears in gure 1. The mission database has a set of objects, three integrity constraints on these objects, and three In Z states, as well as operations, are described with a two-dimensional notation called a schema, in which declarations for the objects appear in the top part and constraints on the objects appear in the bottom part. The objects in the mission database are listed in the schema Mission, which de nes the state of the mission. The object STATUS is a partial function that records the status of each resource which m a y b e Busy or Idle. The information whether a resource is busy or not is classi ed as secret and so the object STATUS has a security level secret. The object ASSIGN is a partial function that relates the resources with status Busy and the threats to which these resources are assigned. The information of the actual resource to threat assignment is classi ed at a higher level, namely top secret. Thus the object ASSIGN has a security level top secret. Note that the partial functions representing the objects STATUS and ASSIGN implicitly captures the following integrity constraints: i each resource can be either busy or idle, and ii each resource can be assigned to at most one threat. An additional integrity constraint on the objects in mission database appear in the bottom part of schema Mission: domSTATUS B fBusyg = dom ASSIGN this states that the set of resources with status busy is exactly the set of resources assigned to threats. Note that this integrity constraint i n v olves objects at di erent security levels: secret and top secret.
The three types of transactions in the mission database are Respond, Cancel and Report as shown in gure 1. Respond takes as input a resource r? and a threat t?. Respond has a precondition that some resource r? m ust be Idle. Respond has a postcondition that the status of r? i s c hanged to Busy, and the ordered pair r? 7 ! t? is added to the function ASSIGN . Cancel cancels an assignment o f a resource to a threat. Cancel has a precondition that r? m ust be assigned to some threat that is, r? must be in the domain of ASSIGN and a postcondition that r? is removed from the domain of the function ASSIGN , and status of r? i s c hanged to Idle. Note that the postconditions in Respond and Cancel update objects at di erent security levels; hence they cannot be modeled using single-level transactions. Report has no preconditions and prints the objects STATUS and ASSIGN as outputs.
Decomposition of Multilevel Transactions
In the previous section we showed how m ultilevel transactions can be speci ed using preconditions and postconditions. Now a precondition check e v aluates to reading one or more database objects and performing some check. A postcondition may involve updating an object; this update may depend on the values of the other objects in the database. Preconditions involve reading objects, and postconditions may i n v olve reading and writing objects. Thus we de ne multilevel transactions as follows:
De nition 1 Multilevel Transaction A multilevel transaction T i is a set of read and write operations in which con icting operations BHG87 are related by the partial order i .
A read or write operation in a multilevel transaction is associated with a security level. The security level of a write operation must be equal to the level of the object it writes. The security level of a read operation must dominate the level of the object it reads. A range of security levels is associated with a multilevel transaction. Each operation in the multilevel transaction must lie within this range. The user's clearance level at a particular session must dominate the range of the multilevel transaction submitted by the user in that session.
To prevent direct violations of the usual mandatory access control policy BL75 b y a m ultilevel transaction, we follow other authors CM92, CJ93, SBJN96 and decompose each m ultilevel transaction into a set of sections, where each section is associated with a single security level. Each section is also speci ed with preconditions and postconditions. To k eep our model simple, we assume that a transaction has at most one section at any security level. Each write operation in a multilevel transaction is associated with exactly one section, but a single read operation in the multilevel transaction may appear in multiple sections. Let the function L map database objects and sections to security levels. We require a section S ij of multilevel transaction T i to obey the simple security property and the restricted ?-property San93 :
1. A section S ij with LS ij = C may read a database object x if Lx C .
2. A section S ij with LS ij = C may write a database object x if Lx = C .
Based on this we de ne transaction decomposition.
De nition 2 Transaction Decomposition A m ultilevel transaction T i is decomposed into a set of sections fS i1 ; S i2 ; : : : ; S in g such that 1. con icting operations in section S ij are related by the partial order ij , 2. orderings of con icting operations speci ed in a section honor the orderings of con icting operations speci ed in the transaction, that is, ij i , and 3. each write operation in T i appears in exactly one section and each read operation in T i appears in at least one section.
To avoid timing channels, it is necessary to order the sections in a way consistent with the security poset structure low to high order, as the following example illustrates. Consider three levels: L Low , M Medium , and H High; two objects: x L , y M; and one transaction: w L x r H x r H y r M x w M y . In this example, the ordering of sections is L, H, M, and the medium section is delayed until the high section completes. The medium section can detect when the low section completes. The high section can modulate its execution time, thereby covertly passing information to the medium section. However given a transaction decomposed according to De nition 2 it may not always be possible to execute the sections in a low to high order, and at the same time respect the ordering relation i .
Note that this problem has been solved by Costich and Jajodia CJ93 , and Smith et al. SBJN96 . Our solution, which is based on that of Smith's SBJN96 , is presented next.
Ordering Sections in a Transaction
Before we show h o w to order the sections in a transaction according to the security poset structure, we need the notion of dependencies developed by Blaustein et al. BJMN93 . A dependency exists between two sections if they contain con icting operations. There can be two t ypes of dependencies between sections of a transaction, depending on the ordering of operations in the underlying multilevel transaction. We adopt a caching technique SBJN96 as the mechanism to correctly treat the H-L and L-H dependencies. The cache is local to the transaction; it is visible only to sections of a single transaction. The cache consists of a number of objects called cached objects. For all practical purposes cached objects are treated as database objects. Note that a cached object is accessed only by sections of a single transaction. In accordance with security requirements, a high section can read the cached objects written by the low section but not vice-versa. The cache is used by the transaction as long as it is active; once a transaction completes the cache associated with the transaction can be discarded.
H-L Dependency High to Low Dependency
The following algorithm shows how w e treat the L-H and H-L dependencies using the cache. A section which writes a database object x writes the old value and the new value of x in the cache. In other words, two new cached objects, ox and nx, are created for each write x operation. From the database perspective, the objects x, ox, nx are distinct. The old value, new value of x are copied into ox, nx respectively. In the original transaction if there is a L-H dependency involving x, the read x operation in the high section is transformed into read nx. If there is a H-L dependency involving x, the read x operation in the high section is converted to a read ox operation and this read ox operation is moved after write x operation of the low section.
The caching technique converts the read operations on database objects to read operations on cached objects. The caching technique can eliminate all H-L dependencies. Once all the H-L dependencies are eliminated, the only dependencies that exist between sections of a transaction are the L-H dependencies. With only L-H dependencies remaining, it is possible to order the sections of a transaction low rst. The importance of the methods for treating H-L and L-H dependencies is that any multilevel transaction can be converted to canonical form and securely executed with the Low-First algorithm. In prior work, this transformation yielded only ML-atomicity BJMN93 ; our result is to achieve semantic atomicity, where either all or none of the sections are executed.
The sections of the decomposed transactions for the mission database are shown in gure 2. The Respond transaction is decomposed into a secret section R1 and a top secret section R2. Similarly the Cancel transaction is decomposed into sections C 1 and C 2 where level of C 1 is secret and that of C 2 is top secret. For each of these transactions, the secret level section must be executed before the top secret level section is executed; thus Respond and Cancel transactions are in the canonical form. The Report transaction is composed of a single top secret section.
After a section has been executed, the original integrity constraints may no longer be satis ed. For this reason, we generalize the integrity constraints; these generalized constraints are satis ed before and after the execution of each section AJR95 . The process of discovering appropriate generalized integrity constraints is outside the scope of this paper. For the seminal discussion of this topic in the context of concurrent execution of programs, see Owicki and Gries OG76 .
The generalized constraint for the mission database is given in the constraint part of the schema DecomposedMission. Notice the use of auxiliary variables, R1ax, R2ax, C 1ax, C 2ax, in the generalized constraint. The auxiliary variables are of type bag Resource. A bag, also known as multi-set, is like a set except that the number of occurrences of each object in the bag is signi cant. All these variables are initialized to the empty bag. A resource r? whose status is changed to Busy in section R1 is included in the bag R1ax in section R1. Finally when the resource is assigned to the threat in section R2, it is added to the bag R2ax. Thus the expression domR1ax -R2ax gives the resources whose status have been changed to Busy but which h a v e not yet been assigned to threats, that is, resources which are in the process of being assigned. Similarly, the expression domC 1ax -C 2ax gives the resources with status Idle but which are still assigned to threats, that is, resources that are in the process of being cancelled. Note that the auxiliary variables are introduced for the purpose of analysis and can be omitted from the implementation. The DecomposedMission includes the schemas MissionSecret and MissionTopSecret. MissionSecret de nes the secret level objects and the constraints de ned on the secret level objects. Similarly, MissionTopSecret de nes top secret level objects and constraints involving top secret level objects.
Note that additional preconditions are introduced in sections R2,C 1, Report1. The precondition in R2 ensures that the integrity constraint, each resource can be assigned to at most one threat, is not violated. The precondition in C 1 ensures that the assignment of a busy resource is canceled. The preconditions in Report1 ensure that no inconsistencies are displayed to the user by ensuring that there are no Respond transactions that have executed R1 but not R2 and that there are no Cancel transactions that have executed C 1 but not C 2.
After showing how transactions in an example can be decomposed, we are now ready to de ne our notion of correctness.
Semantic Correctness
In our model we use semantic correctness, rather than serializability, as the correctness criterion. In this section we develop the notion of semantic correctness by giving a set of properties which ensures that the application does not behave in an undesirable and unexpected way. The rst two properties, namely, the composition property and the isolation atomicity property, describes the behavior of the transaction when it is executed in isolation and without interference from any other transaction. The last three properties, namely, semantic atomicity property, consistent execution property and sensitive transaction isolation property, consider the behavior of the transaction when the transaction is not executed in isolation, that is, when sections of one transaction are interleaved with those of another. Note that the last three properties substitute for the atomicity, consistency and isolation properties of the standard transaction processing model.
Composition Property
The composition property ensures that the transformation applied to the original transaction does not change the semantics of the transaction when considered by itself. In other words, the composition property formally veri es that executing the sections in an order that is consistent with the canonical ordering changes the database objects in the same way as changed by the original transaction.
Composition Property A m ultilevel transaction satis es the composition property if for any given consistent state of the database, executing the sequence of sections on the consistent state is equivalent to executing the original transaction on the same state.
Formally the composition property is stated as follows: Let I denote the original integrity constraints; T i denote the original transaction and S i1 ,S i2 , : : : , S in denote the corresponding sections. The before state and after state of the auxiliary variables are represented by aux, aux 0 respectively.
A transaction T i is said to have the composition property when 
Isolation Atomicity Property
When sections of a transaction are executed sequentially on a consistent database state, it may not be possible to complete the transaction. This may happen if the precondition of some dominating section is not satis ed after the execution of some dominated section. The isolation atomicity property ensures that such a situation is avoided; if a transaction has been partially executed then it will be possible to complete the transaction.
Isolation Atomicity Property A m ultilevel transaction satis es the isolation atomicity property if for any given consistent state of the database, satisfaction of the precondition of the least section implies the satisfaction of the preconditions of all sections. If the transaction has no least section, then the precondition for the transaction is that the database is in a consistent state.
Formally the isolation atomicity property is stated as follows:
A section in a multilevel transaction is the least section if its class is dominated by the classes of all other sections in the transaction. Note that a transaction may not have a least section. For example, consider a transaction with three sections, two m utually incomparable and another that dominates the rst two.
Let I denote the original integrity constraints; T i denote the original transaction and S i1 ,S i2 , : : : , S in denote the corresponding sections.
If S i1 is the least section, the transaction satis es the isolation atomicity when pre S i1^I preS i1 o 9 S i2 . . . S in
The above expression is written in Z. The left hand side of the represents the state satisfying the precondition of the least section S i1 and the original integrity constraints. The right hand side denotes the state satisfying the precondition of the composition of the sections. In cases where a transaction does not have a least section, the transaction is said to have isolation atomicity when I preS i1 o 9 S i2 . . . S in There are many examples of transactions not having isolation atomicity. For example, in the mission database, suppose we enforce a new requirement that each threat can be assigned to at most one resource. In other words, suppose we require ASSIGN to be injective. Then an additional precondition, namely, t? 6 2 ran ASSIGN , m ust be added to the the second section of the Respond transaction. As a result, this modi ed Respond transaction will not have isolation atomicity. However, in the original mission example we h a v e no such requirement and as it turns out all transactions have isolation atomicity the proofs are given in Appendix A.
Isolation atomicity is a necessary property if transactions are to be executed by algorithms based on serializability. For such algorithms, if a transaction lacks isolation atomicity, then it may never complete, thus violating the atomicity requirement. To build on the example of the previous paragraph where ASSIGN is assumed to be injective, suppose that R1 executes successfully, but threat t? i s already associated with some resource in ASSIGN . Then R2 cannot complete. Note that in our model transactions are not executed in isolation and we are able to relax the isolation atomicity requirement. Completion of the transactions is guaranteed by the semantic atomicity property discussed in Section 4.4.
The next three properties we discuss are de ned over histories. Before describing these properties we need the notion of histories.
Semantic Histories
So far we h a v e considered what happens if transactions are executed in isolation, that is, without interference from other transactions. However sections of di erent transactions are allowed to interleave. It is necessary to ensure that each section of a multilevel transaction has preconditions that are strong enough to ensure that the section is correct when confronted with an intermediate state left by the partial execution of some other multilevel transaction. If the section generates output in addition to accessing the database, it is necessary to ensure that the output appears to be generated from a consistent state even if the section executes on an intermediate state. Finally, the integrity constraints must be restored upon the completion of all transactions. To ensure these properties, we develop the notion of a semantic history.
De nition 5 Sectionwise Serial One Version History A sectionwise serial one version history H de ned over a set of multilevel transactions T = fT 1 ; T 2 ; : : : ; T m g is a sequence of sections with 2. for any t w o sections S ij , S ik of some T i 2 T, S ij H S ik in H if S ik 6 i S ij in canonical form of T i , 3. if S ik 2 H , then S ij 2 H , for all sections S ij such that S ij i S ik in canonical form of T i .
Condition 1 ensures that every section of a transaction occurs at most once in a sectionwise serial one version history. Condition 2 ensures that the order of the sections in canonical form of a transaction is preserved in a sectionwise serial one version history. Condition 3 ensures that for every section S ik in a sectionwise serial one version history, all the sections that precede S ik in canonical form of T i are present in the sectionwise serial one version history. Note that in a sectionwise serial one version history H if S ij H S kl , then all operations of S ij must precede any operation of S kl . Also note that H is a total order.
A sectionwise serial one version history lists the sequence of steps in the history; it does not give any information about the state of the database in which the section is being executed. To reason about correct and incorrect interleavings, we need to know the states associated with a history. This motivates us to introduce the notion of semantic history which not only lists the sequence of sections forming the history, but also conveys information regarding the state of the database before and after the execution of each section in the history.
De nition 6 Partial Semantic History A partial semantic history H is a sectionwise serial one version history that is bound to 1. an initial state, and 2. the states resulting from the execution of each section in H . Note that a semantic history H is associated with a sectionwise serial one version history. When we deal with the syntactic aspects of H , we refer to it as a sectionwise serial one version history; when we are interested in the semantic information the states associated with the history H w e refer to it as a semantic history.
De nition 7 Complete Execution An execution of a transaction T i = S i1 ; S i2 ; : : : ; S in in a sectionwise serial one version history H is a complete execution if all n sections of T i appear in H .
De nition 8 Complete Semantic History A partial semantic history H over T is a complete semantic history if the execution of each T i in T is complete.
In the following we identify three necessary properties which allowable semantic histories should possess.
Semantic Atomicity Property
When transactions have been broken up into sections, the interleavings of sections may lead to deadlock that is, a state from which w e cannot complete some partially executed transaction. The semantic atomicity property ensures that deadlock is avoided; if a transaction has been partially executed, then it can eventually complete.
Semantic Atomicity Every partial semantic history H is a pre x of some complete semantic history. k k Garcia-Molina GM83 has a slightly di erent de nition of semantic atomicity, in that he allows for compensating steps. Compensation is problematic from the security perspective, so we omit it here.
Semantic atomicity guarantees that it is possible to complete any partial semantic history. Other transactions may have to be initiated to complete the history. The transactions that have to be initiated in order to complete a partial semantic history may be initiated by the system or by the user. When a transaction is being initiated by the system, we m ust ensure that no low section is being triggered to complete a high section of any transaction. When a transaction is being initiated by a user, the constraints are looser since users are trusted up to their clearance. For instance, reconsider the injective ASSIGN example discussed earlier at the point where R1 had executed but R2 w as blocked because the desired threat t? w as already associated with some resource. A user could initiate a Cancel transaction to disassociate threat t? from its current resource, at which point the R2 section of the Reserve transaction could nish.
Consistent Execution Property
An important property of databases is consistency. When transactions have been decomposed into sections, and sections of di erent transactions are allowed to interleave, the database must be restored to a consistent state after all the transactions complete. We capture this requirement a s the consistent execution property.
Consistent Execution Property If a complete semantic history is executed in a consistent
state, then the nal state resulting from the execution of the history is also consistent.
Sensitive Transaction Isolation Property
When a transaction has partially executed that is, some but not all of its sections have committed the database may be in an inconsistent state; sections of other transactions may be exposed to this inconsistency. In some cases this is problematic. For example, some transactions output data to users; these transactions are called sensitive transactions GM83 . Sensitive transactions should not output any inconsistent data.
Sensitive T ransaction Isolation Property All output data produced by a sensitive transaction T i appears to be generated from a consistent state, even though T i may be executing in an inconsistent state.
In our model, we ensure the sensitive transaction isolation property b y construction. There are two aspects to such a construction. First, for each sensitive transaction, we compute the subset of the original integrity constraints, I , relevant to the calculation of any outputs. This subset of I must be implied by the preconditions of the section or sections that generate the outputs. Second, as pointed out by Rastogi, Korth, and Silberschatz RKS95 , if outputs are generated by m ultiple sections, interleavings between these sections must be controlled to ensure that outputs from later sections are consistent with outputs from earlier sections.
After de ning the necessary properties of a semantic history we n o w proceed to de ne what it means for a semantic history to be correct.
De nition 9 Correct Semantic History A semantic history is correct if it has the following three properties 1. semantic atomicity property, 2. consistent execution property, and 3. sensitive transaction isolation property.
The application developer must prove that all semantic histories generated from the application are correct. If the properties cannot be proved, the speci cation must be revised. Appendix A shows how the proof obligations corresponding to the above three properties can be discharged for the mission database. These proof obligations have been discharged using hand analysis. However for real world complex applications it is desirable to automate as much as possible the veri cation of the properties.
In theory one could use some theorem prover designed for the Z speci cation language to discharge the necessary proof obligations. We decided not to adopt this approach for two reasons. Firstly, Z does not have a trace-based semantics and does not allow for the speci cation of the necessary properties. Secondly, theorem proving is di cult, tedious and time consuming; consequently, e v en with the state-of-the-art theorem provers, such as the PVS ORS92 , only small applications can be veri ed. This motivated us to look at an alternative automated approach known as model checking to get assurance of the properties. Model checking has been used successfully to verify hardware circuits; only recently researchers AG93, WVF96 are advocating this approach t o c heck software.
Fundamental to model checking is its reliance on nite state machines. A model checker requires the system being veri ed be represented as a nite state machine, and the properties be represented as temporal formulae. The model checker then performs an exhaustive search of the state space to see whether the properties hold. Since software systems, in general, are in nite state machines, the model checker cannot directly verify software systems. To solve this problem, researchers WVF96, Jac96 propose developing nite state abstractions of the software system which can be veri ed by model checkers. In Appendix B we describe how w e develop a nite model of the mission application which we v erify using the SMV model checker McM92, CGL94 .
Once we prove the necessary properties for a given application, we get the assurance that all semantic histories generated from the application are correct. Note that semantic histories are sectionwise serial one version histories in which sections of transactions are executed serially. The following section describes the notion of correctness when sections are executed concurrently.
Concurrent Executions
In the previous section we h a v e outlined the correctness criterion for semantic histories. Note that in semantic histories, which are sectionwise serial one version histories, the sections are executed serially. To improve the throughput, sections of one transaction must be executed concurrently with those of another transaction. Our eventual aim is to get a concurrency control mechanism in which sections need not be executed atomically, but the read, write operations of one section can be interleaved with those of another. In this section we describe our notion of correctness in the face of concurrent execution of sections. From now o n w e focus on complete histories and use the word history to refer to a complete history. We begin by giving a de nition of history.
De nition 10 History A history H de ned over a set of multilevel transactions T = fT 1 ; T 2 ; : : : ; T m g , where each transaction T i has been decomposed into i n sections, is a partial order with ordering relation H where:
2. H m i =1 ij ; and 3. for any t w o con icting operations p; q 2 H , either p H q or q H p.
Condition 1 says that the execution represented by H involves precisely the operations of the sections of T 1 , T 2 , : : : , T m . Condition 2 says that the H honors all con ict orderings speci ed within each section. Condition 3 says that every pair of con icting operations are ordered in H .
All the de nitions of the histories given so far assume that there is only one version of a data item in the database. These histories represent the order of execution of operations as viewed by the user. However, if the underlying database is a multiversion database, the system's view of histories will be di erent from the user's view. In a multiversion database, for each data item x, we denote the versions of x by x im ,x jr ,: : : , where x im , x jr are the versions written by section S im , S jr respectively. For each read and write operation, the system must translate the operation into an equivalent operation on some version of the data item. Let h denote the translation function. For a read operation r ij x , h determines the version of x to be read; that is, if hr ij x = x pq , then the value of x pq will be returned by the read operation. For a write operation w ij x , h determines the version of x that will be created; hw ij x = x ij then it means the write operation creates the version x ij . To represent the system's view of the execution of operations we de ne a multiversion history.
De nition 11 Multiversion History A m ultiversion history H de ned over a set of multilevel transactions T = fT 1 ; T 2 ; : : : ; T m g , where each transaction T i has been decomposed into i n sections, is a partial order with ordering relation H where:
1. H = h m i=1 in j=1 S ij ; 2. for each S ij and all operations p ij , q ij in S ij , i f p ij ij q ij , then hp ij H hq ij ; 3. if hr ij x = r ij x kl , then w kl x kl H r ij x kl ; and 4. if w ij x ij r ij x , then hr ij x = r ij x ij .
Condition 1 states that the multiversion history contains the translations of the operations in each section. Condition 2 states that the multiversion history preserves all the operation orderings speci ed by the sections. Condition 3 states that a section cannot read a version before it has been created. Condition 4 states that if a section writes a data item and subsequently reads it, then it must read the version written by itself.
Our objective is to characterize multiversion histories that are equivalent to sectionwise serial one version histories. For this we need the notion of equivalence of histories; this de nition is similar to the one given by Bernstein et al. BHG87 . Before de ning equivalence we need the notion of reads from relationship.
De nition 12 S ij reads x from S kl For a one version history, S ij reads x from S kl if w kl x H r ij x and there is no w mn x such that w kl x H w mn x H r ij x . Fo r a m ultiversion history, S ij reads x from S kl if the operation r ij x kl is present in the history.
De nition 13 Equivalence of Histories Two histories H and H 0 are said to be equivalent, if they are de ned over the same sections and have the same reads from relationship. Two m ultiversion histories H 1 and H 2 are equivalent if they have the same operations.
Next we de ne what it means for a multiversion history to be sectionwise serial.
De nition 14 Sectionwise Serial Multiversion History A m ultiversion history is sectionwise serial if for every two sections S ij and S kl that appear in H , either all of S ij 's operations precede all of S kl 's or vice versa. When all of S ij 's operation precede all of S kl 's operation, S ij is said to precede S kl .
However not all sectionwise serial multiversion histories are equivalent to sectionwise serial one version histories; this is exactly the same issue as in ordinary multiversion databases BHG87 . The following de nition characterizes those sectionwise serial multiversion histories which are equivalent to sectionwise serial one version histories.
De nition 15 One-Copy Sectionwise Serial Multiversion History A sectionwise serial multiversion history H is one-copy sectionwise serial multiversion history if 1. for all ij ; kl, and x, i f S ij reads x from S kl , then either ij = kl or S kl is the last section preceding S ij that writes into any v ersion of x. 2. if S ij precedes S im in H , then S im does not precede S ij in the canonical form of T i .
Finally we de ne a one-copy sectionwise serializable multiversion history in which sections may not be executed serially, but the e ect of the history is the same as a one-copy sectionwise serial history.
De nition 16 One-Copy Sectionwise Serializable Multiversion History A one-copy sectionwise serializable multiversion history is one that is equivalent to a one-copy sectionwise serial multiversion history.
In the following section we describe an algorithm which generates one-copy sectionwise serializable histories.
Concurrency Control Algorithm
Our algorithm is based on the algorithm by Costich and Jajodia CJ93 and it is for a kernelized architecture. The scheduler is divided into two parts: trusted global scheduler which controls the proper sequencing of sections of a transaction, and untrusted local schedulers at each security level which are responsible for scheduling the database operations of a section.
Global scheduler: The decomposed transactions are submitted to the global scheduler. The global scheduler is ready to dispatch a section S ij to the local scheduler when all the sections of T i at levels dominated by LS ij h a v e completed execution. When S ij is ready to be dispatched, the global scheduler generates a unique timestamp for S ij , denoted by tsS ij , and then submits S ij to the local scheduler at level LS ij .
Local Scheduler: Our algorithm assumes that all the read sets and write sets of a section are known in advance. The local scheduler does not execute section S ij until all sections, at dominated levels with earlier timestamps whose write sets have a non-null intersection with the read set of S ij , have committed. The local scheduler then processes the read operations as follows: each r ij x i s translated into r ij x kl where x kl is the version written by section S kl and S kl is the section with the highest timestamp not greater than tsS ij which writes into any v ersion of x. The local scheduler processes write operation as follows: each w ij x is translated into w ij x ij . The local scheduler after completing the section successfully or unsuccessfully informs the global scheduler.
Proof of Correctness
Theorem 1 A history H generated by the concurrency control algorithm is a one-copy sectionwise serializable history.
Proof: Apply the following transformation on the history H : arrange the operations to get a sectionwise serial history H s . The order of sections in H s must be the same as the timestamp ordering. Now w e will show that H s is a one-copy sectionwise serial history. For this we m ust show t w o things: i if there is an operation r ij x kl in H s , then w kl x kl is the last operation preceding r ij x kl that writes into any v ersion of x, and ii H s preserves the canonical ordering of the transaction. We prove i by contradiction. Suppose w ij x kl is not the last operation preceding r ij x kl to write into any version of x. In other words, assume there is another operation say w mn x mn which is the last write operation preceding r ij x kl that writes a version of x. This means that tsS kl tsS mn tsS ij . This is not possible because in the algorithm the scheduler translated r ij x i n to r ij x kl implies that S kl is the section with the highest timestamp not greater than tsS ij that writes into any v ersion of x. Thus we arrive at a contradiction. This means that if S ij reads x from S kl , S kl is the last section preceding S ij that writes any v ersion of x t h us i is satis ed. For ii the proof is as follows. In the algorithm, the global scheduler assigns a unique timestamp to a section and dispatches the section to the local scheduler only after the dominated sections of the same transaction have committed. Hence in a transaction, a section at a dominating level has a higher timestamp than a section at the dominated level. So in H s , the section at dominated level will appear before section at dominating level. Thus H s preserves the canonical ordering of a transaction. Since H s satis es i and ii, it is a one-copy sectionwise serial history. Since H and H s are composed of the same operations they are equivalent; therefore H is a one-copy sectionwise serializable history.
6.Informal Proof of Security
Having proved that our algorithm generates one-copy sectionwise serializable histories, we n o w proceed to prove informally that our algorithm is secure. For proving security we must show the following: i there is no direct illegal information ow from dominating to the dominated levels, and ii our algorithm does not introduce any c o v ert channels.
The multilevel transactions are decomposed into single-level sections. Sections of a transaction are allowed to read objects at dominated levels and write objects at their own level. Thus we enforce the simple security and the restricted *-property of the Bell-Lapadula model San93 ; hence there is no direct information ow from the dominating level to the dominated level.
The proof that our algorithm does not introduce any c o v ert channel proceeds in two parts: a no operation at the dominated level is delayed because of some operation at the dominating level, b no section at dominated level is aborted because of some section at dominating level. First we show that no operation in a dominated section is delayed by a n y operation in the dominating section. Let S ij be the dominated section and S kl be the dominating section. If an operation in S ij is delayed because of some operation in S kl , then S ij and S kl must be accessing some common data item where S ij writes the data item and S kl reads it. For i = k, the proof is trivial: according to the algorithm the dominating section of a transaction is initiated only after the dominated section commits -thus an operation in S kl cannot delay one in S ij . For i 6 = k, the proof is as follows. Since S ij and S kl are distinct, either tsS ij tsS kl o r tsS kl tsS ij . If tsS ij tsS kl , the algorithm will not begin executing S kl until S ij has committed; thus an operation in S ij cannot be delayed by one in S kl . If tsS kl tsS ij , section S kl will not access any v ersion of any data item written by S ij and no operation in S ij will be delayed because of an operation in S kl .
Next we show that our algorithm does not abort a dominated section because of some operation in the dominating section. Let S ij be the dominated section and S kl be the dominating section. For i = k, the proof is trivial, as the dominated sections of a transaction are committed before the initiation of the dominating sections. For i 6 = k, w e m ust show that S ij is not aborted because of S kl .
For this let us consider the section aborts that may occur for concurrency control reasons. Note that in timestamp based algorithm if a section S ij with a smaller timestamp tries to write a data item after another section S kl with a larger timestamp has already read the data item, section S ij will be aborted. In our algorithm this possibility i s a v oided by requiring sections with later timestamps to wait until all sections, at dominated levels whose write sets have a non-null intersection with the read set of the dominating section, have completed execution. In other words, in our algorithm if S kl has a larger timestamp than S ij , S kl will not be initiated until S ij completes and S ij will not be aborted for concurrency control reasons.
Conclusion
Our contribution in this paper is the development of a semantic-based transaction processing model for processing multilevel transactions. We h a v e provided the application developer the conceptual tools necessary to reason about systems in which transactions that ideally should be treated as atomic for reasons of analysis must instead be treated as a composition of sections for reasons of security. The developer begins with a speci cation produced via standard formal methods, decomposes some transactions in the speci cation into single-level sections, and assesses the properties of the resulting system. The formal analysis at each step of this process provides assurance that the resulting system possesses the desired properties.
Some advantages of the semantic approach are that isolation atomicity required for algorithms based on syntactic approach CJ93, CM92 is not required, that more concurrency among sections is allowed, and that the underlying mechanism need not preserve serialization orders between security levels. The cost of semantic concurrency control is that the set of transactions in an application must be analyzed o -line to ensure the set of properties. However, this is a one-time cost incurred during the speci cation stage of an application, and not a performance penalty that must be endured during every execution. For ensuring the properties, proof obligations must be generated and discharged. A signi cant c hallenge of our model is the di culty of discharging the proof obligations. Towards this end, in Appendix B we h a v e shown how the SMV model checker McM92, CGL94 can be used for analyzing applications of interest. Applications in which the proof obligation associated with some necessary property cannot be successfully discharged must be revised. Revising the applications without changing their semantics may not be easy, but at least the developer is aware of the precise trade o s between atomicity, consistency, isolation and security.
Isolation Atomicity Property
Proof Obligations: a pre R1^Mission , preR1 o 9 R2 i b pre C 1^Mission , preC 1 o 9 C 2 ii Proof of a:
The precondition schemas PreR1, PreR1 o 9 R2, which formally compute the preconditions for R1, R1 o 9 R2 are given below.
PreR1 DecomposedMission 
Semantic Atomicity Property
Proof Obligation: Every correct partial semantic history containing one or more incomplete Respond or Cancel transaction is a pre x of a correct complete semantic history.
Proof:
The proof that the mission database has the semantic atomicity property proceeds by induction. In the mission example the transactions Respond and Cancel are decomposed into multiple sections. We refer to a transaction that has completed one or more but not all the sections as an incomplete transaction. Suppose we have n incomplete Respond and Cancel transactions. We show how an incomplete Respond or Cancel transaction can be completed, thereby decreasing the number of incomplete transactions by at least one. By repeated applications of our argument, it is possible to reduce the number of incomplete Respond or Cancel transactions to zero, at which point the history is a complete correct multilevel semantic history.
Consider an incomplete Respond transaction. If the Respond transaction has completed step R1, the preconditions of the next step R2 may or may not be satis ed. Suppose the precondition of the step R2 is not satis ed; this occurs only when a step C 1 executes before the step R1, and the step C 2 has not yet executed, and both the Respond and the Cancel transactions are executing on the same resource. In such a case, the precondition of the step C 2 will be satis ed which can be executed. Moreover the postcondition of the step C 2 will establish the precondition of step R2 which can now execute. In this way the Respond transaction can be completed. Using similar arguments, it can be shown how a Cancel transaction may be completed.
Consistent Execution Property
Proof Obligation: For any complete semantic history H , if the initial state satis es the constraints listed in schema Mission, then the nal state also satis es the those constraints. Proof:
The database is in a consistent state when all the integrity constraints are satis ed. In the example, the database will be in a consistent state when domSTATUS BBusy = dom ASSIGN . In other words, the database will be in a consistent state when domR1ax -R2ax = ? domC 1ax -C 2ax = ? .
Let g R1ax, g R2ax, g C 1ax, g C 2ax be the values of the variables in the initial state of the history. In the initial state when no transactions have been executed the database is in a consistent state and the following relation holds: dom g R1ax -g R2ax = ? g C 1 ax -g C 2ax = ?.
C 2ax be the values of the variables at the end of the complete history. Note that the variable R1ax is updated in section R1 and variable R2ax is updated similarly in section R2. Hence, when all the Reserve transactions have completed execution, the variables R1ax and R2ax are changed in the same way. Therefore, at the end of the complete history,
Similarly when all Cancel transactions have completed execution, dom d
Thus at the end of the complete history, dom d
Therefore when all transactions have completed execution, the database is in a consistent state.
Sensitive Transaction Isolation Property
Proof Obligation:
The Report transaction outputs consistent data.
Proof:
The sensitive transaction isolation property i s a c hieved by construction. Consider the Report transaction. We compute the subset of the original invariants that must hold as a precondition for Report. For this case all the state variables in Mission are involved in the computation of outputs of Report. Thus all the original invariants of Mission must be satis ed for Report to generate consistent output. In other words, the original invariant domSTATUS B fBusyg = domASSIGN must be included as an explicit precondition for Report1. Instead of including such a complex precondition for Report, w e include the more simpler precondition R1ax = R2ax^C 1ax = C 2ax. We do this because simple preconditions are evaluated faster than complex ones. Note that R1ax = R2ax^C 1ax = C 2ax ensures that the original invariant domSTATUS B fBusyg = dom ASSIGN will be satis ed.
For the mission database we have no transactions in which outputs are generated in multiple steps. Thus the problem of outputs from later steps not being consistent with outputs from earlier steps does not arise in this example.
Appendix B Automated Veri cation of the Mission Decomposition
In this appendix we show h o w w e can automatically verify the mission decomposition. We use the SMV model checker McM92, CGL94 for the automated analysis. The model checker cannot directly verify the mission decomposition as the speci cation does not represent a nite state machine. To solve this problem, we developed a nite state abstraction which can be veri ed by the model checker. In the following paragraphs we describe brie y the SMV model checker, the nite state abstraction of the mission database, the speci cation of the properties, the input and the output produced by the model checker.
The SMV Model Checker
The input to the symbolic model checker is a SMV program. The program contains declarations of state variables, the initial states of the variables, the transition relations that changes the state of the variables and the speci cation of the properties to be veri ed. A v ariable can be of the following types: boolean, scalar and xed arrays. The SMV init and next functions de ne the initial value and the next-state value for a state variable. The next functions are usually speci ed with the case expression. A case expression returns the rst expression on the right hand side of the colon :, such that the corresponding condition on the left hand side is true. The properties to be veri ed must be speci ed as Computational Tree Logic CTL formulae. A CTL formula is a boolean expression, an existential E path formula, a universal A path formula, or the application of standard boolean operators to CTL formulae. A path formula is the application of the temporal operators next X, eventually F, or globally G, to a CTL formula.
The SMV produces as output the result of verifying the properties. For each property, it either displays the result that the property holds, or it produces a counterexample illustrating the violation of the property.
Finite State Abstraction of the Mission Database
In the following paragraphs we describe a very simple nite model of the mission database.
State Variables
The nite model has two resources and three possible threats. The ids of the two resources are 1 and 2 respectively. The variable status gives the status information of each resource; status is speci ed as a xed array. status x gives the status of resource x the status of resource x can take on two v alues: 0 indicating that resource x is Idle or 1 indicating that resource x is Busy. rr, cr denote the respective resource input to the Respond and Cancel transaction. When the input is Respond Cancel, rr cr equals 1 or 2; at other times it is equal to 0. The input must be passed as parameters from one step to another. rp cp denotes the parameter that must be passed from section R1 C1 t o R2 C2. rp is speci ed as a xed array; if x is an input parameter that must be passed from section R1 to R2, rp x equals 1, otherwise it is 0. cp is speci ed similarly. The three possible threats are denoted by a, b and c; the threat input to the Respond transaction, denoted by rt, can take o n a n y of these three values. The variable assign which stores the assignment of resource to threat information is speci ed as a xed array. assign x denotes the threat to which resource x is assigned. When resource x is not assigned to any threat, the value of assign x is n.
The auxiliary variables r1ax, r2ax, c1ax, c2ax are speci ed as xed arrays. r1ax x gives the number of times section R1 has executed with resource x as its input. r1ax x can take o n a n y v alues in the range 0 to 3. r2ax x denotes the the number of times section R2 has executed with resource x as its input. c1ax, c2ax are speci ed similarly.
We h a v e one variable input which e n umerates all possible types of sections in the mission database. To ensure that the range of the auxiliary variable does not limit the number of sections that can be executed in the nite state model, we introduce a dummy section known as AuxInit. AuxInit decrements the value of the auxiliary variables in the nite state model but does not alter the database objects. The other sections are responsible for changing the auxiliary variables and the database objects.
To v erify the sensitive transaction isolation property w e need a ag variable, ReportJustExecuted, that indicates whether ReportD has been executed.
State Initialization
The initial state of each variable is speci ed by the init function. In the initial state when no transaction has executed r1ax x is set to 0; similarly, all other auxiliary variables are assigned to 0. Since all resources are idle in the initial state and no resource is assigned to any threat, status x and assign x are assigned the values 0 and n respectively. Initially no ReportD has been executed, and so ReportJustExecuted is initialized to N.
State Transformation
The value of the variable is changed according to the next function. The next function is speci ed by a case expression. Each step which updates a state variable contribute at least one case statement in the expression. The left hand side of the colon : is an expression which is conjunction of the following: i the name of the step activating the state change, ii the preconditions of the step, iii if no direct assignment is made to the variable, extra preconditions to check that the variable lies within the speci ed range, iv a precondition to check that the counter variable is within the speci ed range. The right hand side of the colon : speci es how the variable must be updated if the left hand expression is satis ed. The last statement in the case expression speci es the default value of the variable in case none of the previous cases have been satis ed. The left hand side of the last case statement is 1; if the state variable represents a ag variable the right hand side equals N, otherwise the right hand side speci es the current v alue of the variable.
The initialization and state transformation of the variable status 1 is given below. Specifying the Generalized Integrity Constraints and Properties in CTL Generalized Integrity Constraints
The generalized integrity constraints must be satis ed by all states of the model and so they are speci ed as invariants. Below w e describe how each generalized integrity constraint i s mapped to the corresponding CTL formula.
i Each resource can be either busy or idle. The de nition of status as a xed array ensures this constraint; the variable status x denoting the status of rooms x allows status x to take only one value: 0 o r 1 .
ii Each resource can be assigned to at most one threat. The de nition of assign as a xed array takes care of this constraint; assign x can take only one value which means that at most one guest can be assigned to a room.
iii The set of resources with status busy and the set of resources whose assignment has been canceled equals the set of resources assigned to threats together with the set of resources whose status has been changed to busy but which are not yet assigned to threats. In the next section we show the input that was presented to the SMV model checker.
Consistent Execution Property
The consistent execution property requires the original integrity constraints speci ed in Section 2.1 to hold after the completion of all transactions. Note that the rst two i n v ariants speci ed in Section 7 correspond to the original integrity constraints and they hold in every state in the decomposed speci cation. Only the last invariant iii corresponds to a generalized integrity constraint. Thus for the consistent execution property w e need to show that when all the Respond and Cancel transactions complete, the original integrity constraints corresponding to only item iii is satis ed.
Before specifying the consistent execution property we need to show the speci cation of the original integrity constraints corresponding to item iii. This is as follows:
iii The set of resources with status Busy equals the set of resources assigned to threats. The CTL formula is:
SPEC AGstatus 1 -!assign 1 = n SPEC AGstatus 2 -!assign 2 = n When all Respond transactions complete, the following conditions hold: i r1ax 1 = r2ax 1 , ii r1ax 2 = r2ax 2 , iii c1ax 1 = c2ax 1 , and iv c1ax 2 = c2ax 2 .
The speci cation of the consistent execution property in CTL is given below. 
